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POLICE SCIENCE LEGAL ABSTRACTS AND NOTES
Edited by
Warren L. Swanson and Roger W. Eichmeier*
Removal of Defendants' Property without a
Search Warrant from Place of Arrest for
Subsequent Search Elsewhere Does Not
Violate Fourth Amendment-Defendants were
arrested without warrant by F.B.I. agents and
charged with harboring and concealing persons
convicted of a Smith Act violation. Officers
had placed under surveillance a cabin occupied
by defendants, and, being satisfied that the
fugitives sought were present, proceeded to
make the arrests. Subsequently, without a
search warrant, officers entered the cabin, re-
moved all personal property of the defendants
except the furniture, and transported the
articles two hundred miles to San Francisco
where a search of the material was made.
Testimony indicated that the F.B.I. agents
were not looking for specific articles but that
"they were searching for weapons ... contra-
band or anything that would be a part of the
crime." The Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit, with one dissent, affirmed defendants'
conviction and the denial by the trial judge
of defendants' motion to suppress evidence
obtained from the search. United States v.
Krcmen, 231 F.2d 155 (9th Cir. 1956).
The majority emphasized the fact that a
preliminary search of the house and of the
material found therein had been made at the
time of the arrest and concluded that removal
of all of the contents of the house, except for
the furniture, for a more detailed examina-
tion elsewhere was not unlawful.
Chief Judge Penman, dissenting, main-
tained that a search without a warrant to be
incident to an arrest and therefore lawful
must take place at the location where the ar-
rest is made. "Certainly the siezure and trans-
portation to San Francisco, the home of none
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of the appellants, of all their personal property
other than that found to constitute evidence
was beyond the authority of the federal offi-
cers ... the intent was to search their papers,
and effects in San Francisco and not in the
place of arrest which may have been
authorized."
In an analogous case, defendants were ar-
rested at a motel on the outskirts of Chat-
tanooga on charges of bank robbery and inter-
state transportation of stolen automobiles.
F.B.I. agents, without a search warrant,
towed defendants' automobile from the drive-
way of the motel to a garage in downtown
Chattanooga and there searched the vehicle,
recovering a revolver from the glove compart-
ment. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit affirmed the denial by the trial judge
of the defendants' motion to suppress evidence
obtained from the search. Bartlett v. United
States, 232 F.2d 135 (5th Cir. 1956).
The court held that the search was "sub-
stantially contemporaneous" with and there-
fore incident to the arrest, even though the
search took place at a later time and in a
location other than where the arrest was
made.
Search without Warrant Immediately Pre-
ceding Arrest Is Not Incident to Arrest-
Acting on information received from "a
reliable source" that defendant had partici-
pated in a theft and had several stolen guns in
his apartment and in his automobile, police
proceeded to defendant's apartment and
entered without a search or arrest warrant.
After first investigating the premises and the
trunk of defendant's automobile parked out-
side, they recovered the guns and thereupon
arrested defendant. The trial court denied
defendant's motion to suppress the evidence
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found in the search because it was allegedly
siezed unlawfully by the officers, and de-
fendant was convicted of grand larceny. The
Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit, with one dissent, reversed
defendant's conviction on the grounds that
the search without a warrant preceded and
was therefore not incident to the arrest. Lee
v. United States, 232 F.2d 354 (D.C. Cir. 1956).
The prosecution contended that the search
was incident to an arrest and that the arrest
was lawful because the officers had probable
cause to believe that a felony had been com-
mitted and that defendant had committed it.
The majority concluded, however, that even
if the informer's tip were deemed to have
given the police authority to arrest defendant
without a warrant at once upon entering his
apartment, the officers did not do so but
proceeded to first search for additional evi-
dence upon which to predicate the arrest.
"All this testimony shows that guns were
siezed before the arrest, and that the arrest
in fact was caused by the discovery of the
guns."
Confessions Obtained from Servicemen in
Violation of the Uniform Code of Military
Justice Are Admissible in State Courts-At
the request of civilian police, a naval officer
conducted defendants, members of the armed
forces, to police headquarters for interrogation
about defendants' participation in an alleged
murder. The naval officer in charge of the
defendants testified that he informed de-
fendants of the nature of the ensuing civilian
interrogation and that anything they might,
in the meantime, say to the naval officer could
be used against them as evidence in a subse-
quent court-martial. Article 31 of the Uniform
Code of Military Justice provides: "No
person . . . shall interrogate . . . an accused
without first informing him of the nature of
the accusation and advising him that he does
not have to make any statement regarding
the offense of which he is accused or sus-
pected and that any statement made by him
may be used as evidence against him in a
trial by court-martial."
The naval officer was present during the
interrogation of defendants by the civilian
police but did not participate in the question-
ing. At the conclusion of the interrogation,
defendants remained in the custody of the
naval officer and were returned to their base.
Thereafter, upon exhibition of warrants for
their arrest, the military authorities sur-
rendered defendants to the civilian police. At
the subsequent trial in a state court, defend-
ants objected to the admission in evidence of
incriminating statements made to police
during the interrogation on the grounds that
defendants were at that time in the custody
of the military and the naval officer in charge
did not fully conform to the requirements of
the Uniform Code of Military Justice. The
Supreme Court of Massachusetts affirmed de-
fendants' conviction and concluded that the
Uniform Code is applicable only to military
court-martial proceedings. Comnmonwealth v.
Beaulieu, 133 N.E.2d 226 (Mass. 1956).
The court found that, in fact, the military
officer was not a participant in the civilian
interrogation and that, in any case, the officer
substantially complied with the requirements
of the Uniform Code. However, the court
further indicated that a violation of the
statute by the military officer would in no
way affect the admissibility of the confession
in a state court. "Such a warning as the United
States statutes prescribe is not required as a
condition of the admission of such statements
in our courts . . . Granted Congress could
direct those in United States military service
not to permit the interrogation of persons
subject to their control in the absence of
warnings (which this statute does not do),
there appears no basis for an attempt, were it
to be made, to bar the use of evidence so ob-
tained in State Courts. The Fifth Amendment
is only applicable to Federal actions. Due
process as used in the Fourteenth Amendment
does not require that a defendant be exempted
from compulsory self-incrimination in the
courts of a state."
Inducing Confession by Veiled Promise of
Assistance Does Not Render Confession In-
19561
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voluntary-Defendant was convicted of poison-
ing her husband on the strength of an oral
confession obtained from defendant by the
district attorney, the sheriff, and a deputy.
The defendant was questioned alone for a
period of five and one-half hours. However,
she had at the commencement of the inter-
rogation been informed of her constitutional
rights and told that any statement she made
might be used against her in court. Defendant
knew her interrogators personally and during
the course of the interrogation, the district
attorney related to defendant that when he
was in the army, himself accused of killing
four men, he had received the co-operation of
the investigating officers and had been exoner-
ated by telling the truth. Defendant did not
request counsel until she had revealed all
elements of the crime except where she had
obtained the poison. The district attorney
at that time advised her that counsel was
unnecessary because she had told them every-
thing except where she had obtained the
poison. Defendant then signed a written
confession. The trial court determined that
the oral confession was voluntary but ex-
cluded all statements made after defendant
requested counsel. The Utah Supreme Court
affirmed the conviction and the admission of
the oral confession. State v. Ashdoun, 296
P.2d 726 (Utah, 1956). The crucial question
for the Supreme Court in ruling on the volun-
tariness of this confession was whether the
district attorney's statement to the accused
as to his own experiences was such a veiled
promise of more lenient treatment as to render
the confession involuntary.
The court stated that, ..... There is a wide
disparity in the views of the courts dealing
with the problem of the effect of such vague,
implied promises, and it is obvious that each
of such cases must be considered in light of
all the circumstances." The court rejected the
English view which renders inadmissible as
involuntary any confession obtained after
the accused is exhorted to confess by a person
in authority and adopted the prevailing view
in the United States "that telling the accused
that it would be better for him to tell the
truth does not furnish any inducement, . . .,
to render objectionable a confession thereby
obtained, unless threats or promises are
applied."
The court further stated that adoption of
the majority view is well supported by the
evidence in this instance because: 1) There
was uncontradicted testimony that the dis-
trict attorney related his tale early in the
interrogation; 2) Defendant was warned of the
possible use of any statements made by her in
court; and 3) Defendant was told that the
authorities did not want a confession from
an innocent person.
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